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ABSTRACT

Optional statutory royalty damages are provided for by both the
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act that has been enacted by most
of the forty seven adopting states and the federal patent code remedies
Notwithstanding periodic
for infringement of utility patents.
recommendations that the Uniform Act follow the patent code concept
of statutory royalty damages, this article takes the position that
differences between the Uniform Act and the Patent Code regarding
monetary remedies make it reasonable for the Uniform Act statutory
royalty provisions to be construed more objectively than their federal
counterpart. This will preclude statutory royalty damages acquiring
the unwarranted significance under the Uniform Act that they have
acquired under the Patent Code.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2
Both state trade secret law1 and federal utility patent law
allow recovery of damages measured by a statutory reasonable
royalty. 3 Moreover, courts 4 and commentators5 periodically have
suggested that state trade secret law should follow the extensive
6
federal patent code case law with respect to statutory royalties.
However, due to the different remedial contexts, the current patent
code concept of statutory royalty damages should not apply under the
7
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Uniform Act).

1.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) ("We hold that Ohio's
law of trade secrets is not preempted by the patent laws of the United States .... ").
2.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). The subject matter of utility patents is useful products and
processes. See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.05 (2013) [hereinafter CHISUM ON
PATENTS].

3.
A royalty is a usage-based payment by a licensee to a licensor for a right to ongoing
use of a patent or a trade secret. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1839 (9th ed. 2009). A statutory
royalty is a remedy for patent infringement or trade secret misappropriation that is imposed
upon a wrongdoer. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (providing for damages "in no event less than
a reasonable royalty"), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45, cmt. g (1995)
(discussing a reasonable-royalty measure of common law trade secret relief). This measure of
damages involves determination of the price that would have been set by a willing seller and a
willing buyer for an infringer's use of a patented invention or a misappropriator's use of a trade
secret. See id.
4.
See, e.g., Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("It seems generally accepted that 'the proper measure of damages in the case of a
trade secret appropriation is to be determined by reference to the analogous line of cases
involving patent infringement ... ").
5.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Application of Patent Law Damages Analysis to Trade
Secret MisappropriationClaims: Apportionment, Alternatives, and Other Common Limitations
on Damages, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 821, 865 (2002) ('This article has attempted to demonstrate
the many ways in which the principles that have been developed in the context of evaluating
patent damage claims can be applied with equal effect in the context of trade secret
misappropriation claims.").
6.
See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 536-43 (reviewing primarily patent cases with
respect to reasonable-royalty damages); Smith, supra note 5, at 841 ("Perhaps, the area in which
courts have most fully applied patent law damages principles to trade secret damages claims is
in the area of royalty damages.").
7.
See Mark A. Lemley, The Boundariesof Patent Law: DistinguishingLost Profitsfrom
Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 673 (2009) (recommending that "the
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The Patent Code has not allowed a utility patentee to recover
an infringer's net profits since 1946,8 and it is unlikely that Congress
will amend it to do so.9 Federal case law also imposes overly strict
proof requirements for recovery of a patentee's lost net profits. 10 This
situation has led the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which hears all patent appeals from US District Courts, 1 to approve
inflated awards of statutory royalties in order to assure adequate
compensation to utility patentees. In Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,12 for
example, the Federal Circuit approved instructions directing a jury to
determine both statutory royalty damages and any additional
damages necessary to compensate the utility patentee, which
3
effectively would increase the statutory royalty damages.'
In contrast, the Uniform Act, 14 a widely enacted expression of
state trade secret principles, 15 permits a complainant to recover "both
reasonable royalty measure of damages can return to its original role-as a means of ensuring
that patentees aren't denied fair compensation for the value that they could have demanded in a
fair market for a nonexclusive license to their patents" after discussing the Federal Circuit's
current blurring of a patentee's lost-profit damages and a patentee's reasonable-royalty
damages).
8.
See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 514-16,
520-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding the Special Master erred in considering that an accounting of
an infringer's profits was an available remedy following the 1946 Patent Code amendments).
9.
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 100-01 (2009) ("Congress has spent the last four years, from 2005 to 2008, in an
ultimately futile effort to reform the patent system ....After four years of apparently fruitless
struggle, it appears at this writing that patent reform is dead for the foreseeable future."). In
2011 Congress enacted the America Invents Act, which made a number of substantive and
procedural changes in the patent statutes. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). But the America Invents Act avoided prior legislative controversies
by leaving the remedies for patent infringement essentially unaltered. See 1-SA02 CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supranote 2, America Invents Act 2011: Analysis & Crossreferences § 2.
10.
See Lemley, supra note 7, at 661 ("[Tjhe high standard of proof means that there are
many patentees who are not in fact made whole for the acts of infringement under the lost profits
rule.").
11.
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(establishing the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
12.
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
13.
See id. at 1109-10. Although the Federal Circuit remanded Maxwell, there was no
doubt that both the ultimate reasonable royalty and the ultimate additional damage awards
would be substantial. Prior to the remand, a jury had awarded over $1.5 million in reasonableroyalty damages and $1.5 million in additional damages. See id. at 1108, 1112. Maxwell is one of
a number of Federal Circuit decisions approving inflated statutory royalty damages in order to
avoid undercompensating a utility patentee. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 668 ("[C]ourts have
turned the reasonable royalty from a floor on patent damages designed to avoid
undercompensation into a windfall that overcompensates patentees.").
14.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529-659 (2005),
76-100 (Supp. 2012); see infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
Versions of the Uniform Act have been enacted in 47 states, the District of Columbia,
15.
and the American Virgin Islands. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Table of Adoptions (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 76-77 (Supp. 2012). In 2012, New Jersey became the 46th state to enact the

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 16:2:223

the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss."16 The Uniform Act couples this flexible
approach to actual damages with a rejection of punitive statutory
17
royalties.
Following a general discussion of the Uniform Act and its
relationship with federal utility patent law in Part II, this Article
surveys the monetary remedies for utility patent infringement and
Uniform Act trade secret misappropriation. Part III explores the
unsatisfactory current inflation of utility patent statutory royalty
awards.
Part IV then suggests more appropriate Uniform Act
statutory royalty standards.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts18 was an influential
partial formulation of trade secret common law in the United States. 19
Unfortunately, due to trade secret law's specialized nature, it was
omitted from the 1979 Restatement (Second) of Torts. 20 To fill the gap
left by the Restatement (Second) by elaborating on the common law
principles reflected in the 1939 Restatement, 21 the National
Uniform Act, followed by Texas in 2013. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-4 (West 2012); S.B. 953, 83d
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). New York and Massachusetts are among the states that have not
enacted a version of the Uniform Act. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[7][a] (2013)
[hereinafter POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS]. In the 1995 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
the American Law Institute endorsed a definition of "trade secret" that was consistent with the
Uniform Act definition and articulated principles of trade secret law that also generally were
consistent with the Uniform Act. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b
(1995) ("Except as otherwise noted, the principles of trade secret law described in this
Restatement are applicable to actions under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as well as to actions
at common law.").
16.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 633-34 (2005).
17.
See, e.g., Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 138 F.3d 449, 451-52 (2d
Cir. 1998). In construing the California enactment the court commented: "[A] punitive deterrent
award does not fall within the description of 'actual loss caused by misappropriation' for which
recovery may be had ...
Id.
18.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).

19.
See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319,
323-25 & nn.4-6 (1980) (following the Restatement (First) concept of liability). The Restatement
(First) focused upon liability with limited discussion of remedies and no treatment of the statute
of limitations. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).

20.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 (1979) (stating that trade secret law had
become independent of tort law in introductory note).
21.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005)
(stating that the Uniform Act provides a unified theory of trade secret protection with a single
statute of limitations and appropriate remedies). The 1939 Restatement substantially omitted
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National
The
Conference) 22 proposed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 23
It
1979.24
in
Act
Uniform
the
approved
initially
Conference
National
adopted four official amendments in 1985, two of which involved
25
royalty damages.
One of the 1985 amendments added the following statutory
royalty damages provision to section 3(a) dealing with compensatory
damages:
In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by
royalty for
misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable
26
a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.

Another 1985 amendment limited the availability of the royalty
order injunctions authorized by section 2(b):
In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a
reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been
prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and
prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or2 7reason to know of
misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.

These amendments addressed different remedies. Section 3(a)
deals with the compensatory damages recoverable for a defendant's
prior misappropriation; whereas section 2(b) deals with injunctive
relief that restrains continued misappropriation by an adjudicated

discussion of remedies and did not address the statute of limitations. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 9 (1979); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).

22.
The National Conference was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and practicable
uniformity in state laws. Commissioners are appointed by each state, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico. See Preface, 14 U.L.A. III-IV (2005).
23.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529-659 (2005),
76-100 (Supp. 2012).
24.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14. U.L.A. 529-659 (2005).
25.
See id. The four amendments were adopted in response to issues raised by the ABA
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law. See Action on Resolutions at the Annual
Meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana-August 1981, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. PROC. 30-31. The ABA Section recommended amending section 2(b) to limit
injunctions allowing future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty to exceptional
circumstances, amending section 3 to allow reasonable-royalty damages if neither a plaintiffs
actual loss nor a defendant's unjust enrichment were provable, amending section 7 to make clear
that state remedies for breach of contract would not be preempted by the Uniform Act, and
amending section 11 to clarify that the Uniform Act does not apply to a continuing
misappropriation that began prior to its effective date. See id. (Resolutions 206-3 to 206-6).
26.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005). The
initial version of the Uniform Act did not refer to reasonable royalties as a remedy. See id.
27.
See id. § 2(b). The 1979 text of section 2(b) stated: "If the court determines that it
would be unreasonable to prohibit future use, an injunction may condition future use upon
payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have been
prohibited." See id.
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misappropriator. 28 The amendments to both of these sections involve
remedies that apply when misappropriation is not willful and
malicious. 29 Willful and malicious misappropriation is addressed by
other sections. Section 3(b) authorizes "exemplary damages" in an
amount up to double a compensatory award, and section 4 authorizes
30
recovery of reasonable attorney's fees.
B. Nonuniform Amendments

James Pooley commented that "[t]he major drawback of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act is that it is not uniform." 31 Although
Pooley overstates its significance, superficial nonuniformity surely
exists. To begin with, five states that enacted the 1979 version of the
Uniform Act have not enacted the 1985 amendment authorizing
statutory royalty damages. 32 Individual states have also adopted a
number of nonuniform amendments.
California and Indiana adopted nonuniform amendments based
upon an ABA Patent Section resolution 33 providing that if neither loss
nor unjust enrichment are provable, a patentee can recover statutory
34
royalty damages for no longer than use could have been prohibited.
The Georgia and Illinois versions allow statutory royalty damages if a
person with trade secret rights proves neither damages nor unjust
35
enrichment by a preponderance of the evidence.
28.
See Robert L. Cloud & Assoc. v. Mikesell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 147-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that one provision authorizes injunctive relief and the other a monetary award);
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(b), 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619, 634 (2005).
29.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(b), 3(a)-(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619,
633-634 (2005).
30.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 3(b), 4(iii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634, 642
(2005).
31.
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 15, § 2.03[71[b]. The recent New Jersey and
Texas enactments contain the 1985 Official Text of the reasonable-royalty provision. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:15-4 (West 2012); S.B. 953, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
32.
Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, and Washington do not expressly
authorize reasonable-royalty damages. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.915 (West 2007); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-75-606 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-53 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1433 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.030 (West 2013).
33.
See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3426.3(b) (West 1997); IND. STAT. ANN. § 24-2-3-4(b)
(LexisNexis 2006).
34.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-4(b)
(LexisNexis 2006).
35.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-763(a) (2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/4(a)
(LexisNexis 2010). The Georgia statute, like the California and Indiana statutes, adds "for no
longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited." GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1763(a); CAL. CiV. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-4(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
An Oregon provision states that a damages or an unjust enrichment recovery "shall not be less
than a reasonable royalty," and the Virginia statute approximates this by measuring damages
"exclusively" by a statutory royalty "[i]f a complainant is unable to prove a greater amount of
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The nonuniform amendments primarily involve style rather
than substance. The related 1985 amendments allow a complainant
to elect statutory royalty damages in lieu of other measures of
damage. 36 The nonuniform variations allow a similar election if a
complainant chooses not to prove loss and unjust-enrichment
damages. 37 For example, in Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp.,3s
a case involving California's nonuniform amendment, a jury found
that the defendant had not been unjustly enriched, and the plaintiff
withdrew its claim for actual loss after the defendant moved to
exclude the plaintiffs evidence. 39 Neither actual loss nor unjust
enrichment having been proven under the California nonuniform
amendment, the intermediate appellate court remanded 40the case to
the trial court for the determination of a statutory royalty.
Furthermore, the California, Georgia, and Indiana nonuniform
amendments limiting statutory royalty liability to the period for which
use could have been prohibited 41 express the Uniform Act's policy of
limiting trade secret remedies to the commercial advantage gained
42
from misappropriation.
The five state enactments of the Uniform Act that do not
mention royalty damages nevertheless can be construed to permit
damages by other methods of measurement." 14 ORE. REV. STAT. §646.465(2) (2011); 9 VA. CODE
ANN. §59.1-338A (LexisNexis 2006). Finally, an Ohio nonuniform amendment adds to the 1985
Official Amendment, "a reasonable royalty that is equitable under the circumstances considering
the loss to the complainant, the benefit to the misappropriator, or both." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1333.63(A) (Baldwin, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)).
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005) ("In lieu of
36.
damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappopriator's unauthorized
disclosure or use of a trade secret.").
See Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 184-85 (Cal. Ct. App.
37.
2010); supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. But see Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co.,
169 F.3d 619, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1999) (Cal. enactment) (rejecting a plaintiffs unsupported
assertion that unjust enrichment of the defendant was not provable). The Virginia nonuniform
amendment's reference to "exclusive" measurement of damages by a statutory royalty would be
unfortunate only if it were unnecessarily construed to preclude election of statutory royalty
damages in some markets but not others as is possible under the Uniform Act. See 9 VA. CODE
ANN. §59.1-338A (LexisNexis 2006); infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
38.
See id. at 184-85 (noting that the jury found that the defendant's expenditures with
39.
respect to the misappropriated trade secrets exceeded the benefit derived from them, and the
plaintiffs proof of losses had been withdrawn after the defendant had moved to exclude it).
See id. at 185.
40.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
41.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005)
42.
(stating that a monetary recovery for trade secret misappropriation is appropriate only for the
period in which information is entitled to protection as a trade secret); see also, e.g., Carboline
Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540, 553 (Mo. 1970) (limiting damage liability to the period of time it
would have taken the defendant to replicate the trade secrets lawfully); supra notes 34, 36 and
accompanying text.
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them. Veritas Operating Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,43 for example, was
decided under the Washington-state enactment, which is silent with
respect to statutory royalty damages. 44 The defendant moved to
exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs expert concerning
reasonable-royalty damages, which the defendant asserted the
plaintiff could not recover in Washington. 45
Finding that the
defendant's unjust enrichment could be measured by a reasonable
46
royalty, the trial judge denied the defendant's motion.
Under both the Uniform Act and its nonuniform variations, it
would be unreasonable to insist that an election of statutory royalty
damages must be exclusive of other nonduplicative damages. To the
extent that lost-profit or unjust-enrichment damages are provable,
these
damages
frequently
will be
more
objective
than
reasonable-royalty damages.
As under the Patent Code, a
complainant should be free to request a hybrid damage award
47
combining consistent statutory royalty damages with other damages.
In Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland,48 a case decided under the
Delaware enactment, for example, the plaintiff recovered lost-profit
damages for markets in which the plaintiff and the defendant
competed and unjust-enrichment damages for markets in which the
plaintiff did not compete with the defendant. 49 If the defendant had
not earned profits in the markets in which the plaintiff did not
compete, the plaintiff would have been entitled to elect statutory
50
royalty damages for those markets.
C. The Relationship between State Trade Secret Law and Federal
Utility Patent Law
In order to encourage the development and marketing of useful
inventions, a federal utility patent confers upon a patentee, inter alia,
the right to exclude others from the manufacture, use, or sale of a

43.
Veritas Operating Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0703-JCC, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112135 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2008).
44.
See id. at *7-8; supra note 32 and accompanying text. The other enactments that do
not mention statutory royalty damages are in Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Louisiana. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
45.
See Veritas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112135, at *5.
46.
See id. at *9-10.
47.
See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725, at *28-31 (Del.
Ch. 2010).
48.
See id.
49.
See id.
50.
Cf. Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 529, 536, 539-40
(5th Cir. 1974) (upholding jury charge that misappropriators that had earned no profits
nonetheless could be liable for a reasonable royalty).
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useful invention for a term beginning on the patent issue date and
ending twenty years from the date of the filing of an effective patent
application. 51 Good faith conduct, including independent development
of a patented invention, usually is no defense to liability for patent
infringement.52 As of March 16, 2013, federal utility patent rights are
reserved for the first person to file an effective patent application for a
novel, useful, and nonobvious invention within a category established
5
by Congress.
A quid pro quo for statutory utility patent rights is the loss of
trade secret rights through voluntary disclosure. 54 The information in
a patent application ordinarily becomes public. 55 The US Patent and
Trademark Office publishes most patent applications eighteen months
after the earliest filing date. 56 If a patent issues with respect to an
51.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (providing a basic definition of patent infringement); 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (outlining patent duration).
52.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
(dictum) (stating that use by a second inventor who discovered the invention independently is
infringement). Effective March 16, 2013, amendments to the Patent Code have expanded a
former limited defense to infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012). The expanded defense
exists if a person in good faith commercially used in the United States a process or a machine, a
manufacture, or a composition of matter used in a commercial process that is the subject of an
issued patent at least one year before either the effective filing date for the claimed invention or
the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the public in a manner that qualified as
an exception to prior art. See id. The defense is transferrable to a person other than the patentee
only in connection with the "entire enterprise" or "line of business to which the defense relates."
See id. § 273(e)(1)(B).
53.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2012) (requiring that a patentable invention be useful,
novel, and not obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the relevant art); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161, 171
(2012) (providing categories of patentable inventions, including processes, machines,
manufactures, compositions of matter, and improvements thereof in addition to certain biological
plants and new and ornamental designs of articles of manufacture). Federal design-patent rights
for new, original, and ornamental designs of articles of manufacture are materially different
from federal utility patent rights and are not dealt with by this article. See 1 CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 2, § 23.01 ("A design patent fundamentally differs from a utility patent.").
The person that files the earliest effective patent application has priority. See 35 U.S.C. §
100(i)(B) (2012) (effective Mar. 16, 2013). The former rule gave priority to the first inventor. See
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2012) (providing that the first inventor who has not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed an invention has priority). Because the change is not retroactive, the United States
will have two Patent Codes for decades. Patents issued under applications filed before the March
16, 2013 effective date of the Patent Code amendment will continue to be governed by the Patent
Code in effect prior to March 16, 2013, and cases decided under it. See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS,
supranote 2, America Invents Act 2011: Analysis & Crossreferences § 3.1.
54.
See POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 15, at § 3.01[1][a] ("In exchange for the
inventor's publication of the invention, a 'monopoly' of sorts is granted by the government.").
55.
See id. ("[P]ublication usually does not occur until eighteen months after the patent
application is filed ... or issuance of the patent.").
56.
See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2012) (stating that, with exceptions, patent applications
are to be published eighteen months after the earliest filing date); 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2012)
(providing that all papers relating to published patent applications are open to public inspection
and copying). But see 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (explaining that an application will not be
published if an applicant requests nonpublication and certifies that that an application will not
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application excepted from publication, information relating to the
57
patent application becomes available to the public upon issuance.
The publication of a patent application destroys the secrecy of
the published information, precluding future trade secret protection.58
59
That the patent may be later invalidated by a court is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, during the interval between filing a patent application
and the application becoming public, state trade secret rights can
60
continue to exist with respect to the information in the application.
Moreover, new information acquired after the filing of a patent
61
application can remain secret.
State trade secret law is an alternative method of protecting
patentable useful inventions and other valuable commercial
information.6 2 But utility patent protection must be sought prior to
marketing a product that reveals a trade secret. 63 Sale of the product
discloses the trade secret and destroys the secrecy required for
continued trade secret protection. 64 Inventors should also seek utility
be filed in another country or under a multinational international agreement that requires
publication of applications eighteen months after filing).
57.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2012).
58.
See, e.g., On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133,
1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that information disclosed by an issued patent is not subject to
trade secret rights); Vital State Can., Ltd. v. Dreampak, LLC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524-25
(D.N.J. 2003) (holding that the complainant failed to rebut the inference that its published
patent applications put its trade secrets into the public domain).
59.
See Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 154-56 (2d
Cir. 1949) (holding that trade secrets disclosed by an invalid patent are in the public domain).
60.
See Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 303 A.2d 725, 733-34 (Conn. 1972)
(holding that trade secret relief remains available during the pendency of a patent application).
But see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Code amendment
requiring disclosure of most patent applications eighteen months after the earliest filing date
and finding that the public disclosure of an application that has been on file for eighteen months
precludes further trade secret rights with respect to the information disclosed).
61.
See Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 553, 558-59
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a continuation application not involving new matter need not
update an initial disclosure). For example, trade secret rights can exist in a unique combination
of the information disclosed in one or more published patent applications. See Tewari De-Ox
Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604, 612-14 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that
the fact that every element of an alleged trade secret either was disclosed by patent applications
or was known to the industry did not preclude the existence of a trade secret involving a new
combination of the known elements).
62.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484-93 (1974) (noting that trade
secret law applies to inventions that are clearly unpatentable, of doubtful patentability, and
clearly patentable).
63.
See IA ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 8.02
(2012) (observing that the embodiment of a secret in a product that will be sold in most cases
makes a patent the only meaningful protection).
64.
Cf. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475 ('The subject of a trade secret must be secret,
and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business." (citing
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio 1963); Nat'l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co.,
3 Ohio C.C. 459, 462 (1902), affd 69 Ohio St. 560 (1903))).
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patent protection if competitors are likely to discover a trade secret
Otherwise, a choice
independently in the foreseeable future. 65
between utility patent and trade secret protection for a patentable
product or process should be made with deliberate speed. Prior to the
patent code amendments that became effective on March 16, 2013,
secret commercial use of an invention more than a year before a
patent application was considered a "public use" that barred the
application.6 6 Notwithstanding the amendments, this well-established
67
judicial construction of "public use" may continue.
If information remains valuable and secret, trade secret
protection theoretically can be perpetual. 68 But, trade secrets are only
Thus,
protected from misappropriation by improper means. 69
acquiring knowledge of a trade secret by proper means, including
independent discovery and reverse engineering 70 of a publicly
available product, is not actionable. 71 The improper-means limitation
upon actionable trade secret misappropriation, when combined with
the immunity of utility patent rights from the defenses of lack of
secrecy and independent discovery by proper means, 72 make it
unlikely that the existence of trade secret law discourages patent
applications. A Supreme Court majority in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron

See id. at 490 ('The ripeness-of-time concept of invention . . . predicts that if a
65.
particular individual had not made a particular discovery others would have, and in probably a
relatively short period of time."). Moreover, in a particular industry, multiple competitors
actively may be researching the subject matter of a trade secret. See id. at 490-91.
66.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (effective Mar. 16, 2013) (noting that public use,
being on sale, or otherwise being available to the public more than a year prior to the filing of a
patent application precludes patentability); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389-91
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (observing that a secret commercial use is a public use for purposes of the bar to
patentability). A patent that erroneously was issued notwithstanding public use more than a
year prior to the filing of the patent application will be invalidated by the courts. See, e.g., C&F
Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1300-01 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the patent was
properly invalidated by the trial court because the invention had been on sale more than one
year before the application date).
67.
See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, America Invents Act 2011: Analysis &
Crossreferences § 3.3.1.3.
68.
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 473-74, 493 (reinstating district court injunction
restraining disclosure or use of trade secrets until secrecy ends).
69.
See id. at 475-76 ('The law also protects the holder of a trade secret against
disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner's volition, but by some
'improper means."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939))).
70.
The Supreme Court has defined "reverse engineering" as "starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture." See id. at 476 (citing Nat'l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. 459, 462 (1902),
afl'd, 69 Ohio St. 560 (1903)).
71.
See id. at 489-90 (stating that trade secret law provides far weaker protection than
patent law, permitting discovery of trade secrets by fair and honest means).
72.
Effective March 16, 2013, a previously limited defense for certain prior users of a
patented invention has been expanded. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Corp.73 consequently concluded that federal utility patent law does not
preempt the traditional state trade secret law upon which the Uniform
74
Act is based.
III. MONETARY REMEDIES
A. Monetary Remedies for Utility Patent Infringement
Section 284 of the Patent Code contains the basic monetary
remedies for utility patent infringement:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event
75
the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.

A judge also has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing party "in exceptional cases. ' 76 A patentee that proves
willful infringement can receive both enhanced damages and
77
reasonable attorney's fees.
This basic damage provision entitles a patentee with a valid
and infringed utility patent to recover either a reasonable royalty for
infringement 78 or, if greater, the patentee's provable losses from

73.
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474.
74.
See id. at 474, 489-90 (stating that inventors with clearly patentable inventions are
unlikely to forego strong patent rights for far weaker trade secret protection). But unwarranted
extensions of state trade secret law are preempted. Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-68 (1989) (preempting a state prohibition upon reverse engineering a
public domain vessel hull design). Following the Bonito Boats decision, Congress passed a statute
authorizing copyright protection for original vessel hull designs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332
(2012).
75.
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). A trial court has discretion to enhance the damages
found by either the court or a jury up to three times the amount found to exist. See id. Willful
infringement is the most common reason for enhancing damages. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
Libby-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("While a finding of willful
infringement is sufficient to support an award of increased damages... on the record before us it
was neither clear error nor an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny Shatterproofs motion."
(internal citation omitted)).
76.
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
77.
With respect to enhanced damages, willful infringement must be established by clear
and convincing evidence that an infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d
1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A similar showing is required to impose liability for a patentee's
attorney's fees upon an infringer. See 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, § 20.03[4] [c] [ii].
78.
See Lemley, supra note 7, at 655 ("As the statutory language suggests, reasonable
royalties exist as a floor or backstop for those who cannot prove that they have lost profits as a
result of infringement.").
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infringement-typically the patentee's lost net profits. 79 Although a
utility patentee cannot recover an infringer's net profits per se, 80 an
infringer's net profits are relevant to a patentee's lost net profits if the
patentee proves that he or she would have made all or a percentage of
the infringer's sales.8 1 An infringer's net profits also are relevant to
82
the amount of a statutory royalty.
If a patentee seeks to recover lost net profits under section 284,
courts require rigorous proof of actual lost profits.8 3 On the other

79.
See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (6th Cir.
1978) (discussing how a patentee must prove lost profits and explaining why there was a failure
of proof in the case). The Federal Circuit has approved the Panduit analysis. See Siemens
Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also Lemley, supra note 7, at 657-61, 671-72 (stating that the Federal Circuit
should be more liberal in allowing lost-profit recoveries by patentees that compete directly with
infringers).
80.
See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 504-07 (1964)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that a 1946 amendment to the Patent Code changed the law so as
to preclude a patentee's recovery of an infringer's profits per se). Although this aspect of the Aro
opinion was the view of only a plurality of the Court, see id., 377 U.S. at 502 n.18 (expressing the
views of four justices), it caused a shift in the tenor of lower court decisions. See 7 CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 2, § 20.02[4][c]. Under prior law, there frequently had been protracted
litigation with respect to the amount of an infringer's profits. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) ("In 1946 Congress excluded consideration of the infringer's gain
. . . the determination of which had often required protracted litigation." (internal citations
omitted) (citing H.R. REP NO. 1587, at 1-2 (1946); S. REP. NO. 1503, at 2 (1946) (statement of
Sen. Pepper))). On the other hand, design patentees are entitled to recover an infringer's net
profits. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012) (stating that an infringer "shall be liable ... to the extent of
his total profit, but not less than $250").
81.
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) ("[Jif the patent owner can establish that he was in competition with the infringer in the
sale of the patented article and that, absent the infringement, he would have made the
infringer's sales of the patented item, but he finds it extremely difficult or impossible to prove
what his, the patent owner's, profits would have been had he made these waylaid sales, then, the
infringer's profits on these sales may logically (i.e., probatively) be used as a rough equation for
the patent owner's lost profits." (citing Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881))).
82.
See id. at 529 ('The size of an infringer's profits is often an influential factor in the
determination of the amount of a reasonable royalty." (citing Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635
(9th Cir. 1952); Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353 (D. Del.
1960), affd, 290 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1961))). In a hypothetical negotiation, the theory is that a
willing licensor and a willing licensee would establish a royalty rate that divided the economic
benefit of the patented invention between them. See 7 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 2, §
20.07[21[d].
83.
In the leading case, Panduit,the Sixth Circuit commented:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove: (1)
demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes,
(3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
amount of the profit he would have made.
575 F.2d at 1156 (citing 3 R. WHITE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE AND TACTICS § 9.03[2];

Bros. Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1963); Elec. Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid
Sys., Inc. 250 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1957)). The Federal Circuit has endorsed this analysis. See
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hand, utility patentees are allowed great latitude in proving statutory
royalty damages for past infringement.8 4 Statutory royalty damages
are based conceptually on a hypothetical negotiation between a willing
patentee and a willing infringer at the time that the infringement
began.8 5 The hypothetical negotiation is a device for analyzing
reasonable compensation. It is not dependent upon the parties' actual
willingness to negotiate.8 6 The prevailing concept of a hypothetical
negotiation derives from a 1970 federal district court opinion in
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.8 7 The Georgia-Pacific
analysis assumes that, during a hypothetical negotiation, the parties
know that a patent is valid and has been infringed.8 8 The hypothetical
license under negotiation is assumed to be nonexclusive and "naked,"
meaning unaccompanied by a patentee's related rights to know-how,
trademarks, and copyrights.8 9

Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
84.
Another type of patent code reasonable-royalty
damages is "ongoing"
reasonable-royalty damages for future infringement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012). If a
district court denies a patentee a permanent injunction against infringement and the parties are
unable to agree upon a reasonable royalty, the district court can exercise its equitable power to
order an infringer to pay a reasonable royalty for future infringement. See, e.g., Affinity Labs of
Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895-901 (E.D. Tex. 2011), appeal
dismissed, 462 F. App'x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (unpublished decision). See generally Mark A.
Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695 (2011) (discussing
the complications of ongoing royalties). This patent code remedy is analogous to a royalty order
injunction authorized by Uniform Act section 2(b) rather than reasonable-royalty damages
authorized by Uniform Act section 3(a). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
85.
See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
("The hypothetical negotiation requires the court to envision the terms of a licensing agreement
reached as the result of a supposed meeting between the patentee and the infringer at the time
infringement began." (citing Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed.
Cir. 1983))).
86.
See id. at 1554 n.13 (referring to the hypothetical negotiation as involving a "willing
licensor/willing licensee' is "inaccurate" and even "absurd" when the patentee does not wish to
grant a license (citing Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir.
1983); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp. 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
87.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1971); see Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A StructuredApproach to CalculatingReasonable
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 629 (2010) ("The universally accepted test for
reasonable royalty damages comes, perhaps improbably, from a 1970 district court case .... ").
Although the Second Circuit modified the district court's conclusions, it is the district court
opinion that has been influential. See id. at 631 (stating that the district court's opinion has
become "gospel").
88.
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2018 (2007) (stating that both patent validity and infringement are assumed).
89.
Robert Goldscheider, The Employment of Licensing Expertise in the Arena of
Intellectual Property Litigation, 36 IDEA 159, 174-75 (1996) (commenting upon the assumption
that a hypothetical license is nonexclusive and naked). But, under Georgia-PacificFactor three, a
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Georgia-Pacific opinion nominally listed fifteen
The
nonexclusive factors pertaining to a reasonable royalty. 90 Factor
fourteen, however, merely invites expert testimony to provide a basis

court can consider evidence of the type of license the parties would have negotiated. See Durie &
Lemley, supra note 87, at 638.
90.
The district court stated:
The following are some of the factors mutatis mutandis seemingly more pertinent to
the issue herein:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted
or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured
product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or
whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of
the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed
sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if
any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment
of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have
used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence
probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee[-]who desired, as business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention[-]would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). As a
practical matter, the factors used as evidence ordinarily consist of either two or, at most, eleven
of the other thirteen factors. See id.
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for assessing the other factors, and Factor fifteen simply describes the
hypothetical negotiation device for determining a reasonable royalty. 9 1
Factors one and two are considered initially. Factor one
pertains to the royalties received by the patentee for licensing the
utility patent in suit, and Factor two deals with the royalty rate paid
by the "licensee" (the infringer) for the use of patents comparable to
the utility patent in suit.92 But if neither Factor one nor Factor two is
satisfied, they are no longer relevant. 93 By the same token, if either
Factor one or Factor two is satisfied, the remaining factors are not
94
relevant.
Professor Mark Lemley and Daralyn Durie have suggested
distillation of the fifteen nonexclusive Georgia-Pacificfactors into the
following four nonexclusive factors:
[Tihe relevant questions in calculating a reasonable royalty fall into four basic
categories: (1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the
contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3)
the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work;
and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it
differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).95

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also has recommended
radical alteration of the Georgia-Pacificfactors. 96 In order to increase
the accuracy of statutory royalty awards in patent cases, the FTC
recommended in March of 2011 that the basic test should be the
hypothetical negotiation
described in Georgia-Pacific Factor
fifteen-without regard to considerations like punishing or deterring
infringement or a patentee's unproven lost net profits. 97 According to
the FTC, the other Georgia-Pacific factors simply comprise a
nonexclusive list of evidentiary categories that may or may not be

91.
See id.
92.
See id.
93.
See Goldscheider, supra note 89, at 175 (stating that several cases hold that the
existence of an established royalty obviates a need to consider the other eleven factors).
94.
See id.
95.
Durie & Lemley, supra note 87, at 636. Lemley and Durie analyze the relationship of
their four factors to the fifteen Georgia-Pacificfactors. See id. at 636-44 (correlating each of the
four factors with its counterparts in the Georgia-Pacific fifteen-factor test). The first
Lemley-Durie factor distinguishes between patentees that produce goods for the market either
directly or through an exclusive licensee and nonpracticing entities that license others to produce
goods for the market. See id. at 636-37.
96.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION
MARKETPLACE], available at 2011 WL 838912.

(2011)

[hereinafter

FTC,

THE

EVOLVING

IP

97.
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971); FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 96, at *81, *84.
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relevant to a particular statutory royalty calculation. 98 The FTC
emphasized that evidence should not be admitted solely because it
relates to one of the Georgia-Pacificfactors. 99 Moreover, there should
be three general characteristics of admissible expert testimony: (1) a
reliable methodology; (2) an application of the methodology to the facts
of the case; and (3) the availability of sufficient data to justify
conclusions. 100

It is also important to note that the Georgia-Pacific
multi-factor test was formulated and applied by a trial judge sitting
without a jury.101
Today, however, juries decide most patent
0
1
2
litigation.
There are strong indications that the Georgia-Pacific
nonexclusive multi-factor test gives little practical guidance to juries
and makes it difficult for judges to determine whether a jury verdict is
supported by substantial evidence.103
Nevertheless, the original
Georgia-Pacific list of nonexclusive factors remains the basis for
10 4
patent code statutory royalty awards.
B. Uniform Act Monetary Remedies
In addition to authorizing recovery of a reasonable royalty,
Uniform Act section 3(a), as amended, provides:
Except to the extent that material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring
knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery
inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation.
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust
enrichment 0caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
5
actual loss. 1

The 1979 version of section 3(a) was essentially the same
except in two respects. The exception for good faith acquirers who

98.
See FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 96, at *84-85.
99.
See id. at *92.
100.
See id.
101.
See Georgia-PacificCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1117-19 (trial judge's determination of a
reasonable royalty), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446
F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
102.
See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1688 (2010) (noting that most
contemporary patent litigation is before a jury).
103.
See Durie & Lemley, supra note 87 at 631-36 (stating that juries regularly disregard
instructions with respect to the Georgia-Pacificfactors and that judges are reduced either to
deferring blindly to jury determinations or to substituting their view of the evidence for a jury's
and that reviewing published decisions citing or relying upon Georgia-Pacificindicated that
blind deference has been the norm).
104.
See id. at 628 (describing the Georgia-Pacific test as "the gold standard for
calculating reasonable royalty damages").
105.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 633-34 (2005).
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materially and prejudicially changed their position before being
notified of misappropriation and the statutory royalty provision were
omitted.106 The drafters added the first exception to conform to an
exclusion.
Uniform Act section 1(2)(ii)(C) excludes from
"misappropriation" disclosure or use of a trade secret by a person who
materially changed position before knowing or having reason to know
that the information was a trade secret, knowledge of which had been
10 7
acquired by accident or mistake.
The Uniform Act does not provide for minimum damages.' 08 A
plaintiff that does not seek injunctive relief must prove substantial
actual-loss damages, substantial unjust-enrichment damages, or
substantial statutory royalty damages in order to recover a
judgment. 10 9
Basic-loss damages are a plaintiffs lost net profits,11 0 including
net profits lost due to price erosion caused by misappropriation."'
Basic unjust-enrichment damages are either a defendant's net profits
from misappropriation 1 2 or a defendant's expenses saved by
106.
Compare id., with id. (1979) ("In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a
complainant may recover damages for the actual loss caused by misappropriation. A complainant
also may recover for the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into in
computing damages for actual loss.").
107.
See id. § 1(2)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. 537.
108.
See id. § 3(a), 14. U.L.A. 633-34 (neither the 1979 nor the 1985 Official Text refers to
minimum damages); Alphamed Pharm. Corp. v. Arriva Pharm., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1319,
1334-40 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (vacating jury verdict of nominal damages under the Florida
enactment).
109.
See Alphamed Pharm. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
110.
See, e.g., Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 945-46
(7th Cir. 1996) (affirming jury award under the Illinois enactment of a plaintiffs lost profits on
sales made possible by misappropriation).
111.
See, e.g., id. (affirming jury award under the Illinois enactment of lost profits caused
by plaintiffs price reductions due to competition made possible by misappropriation).
112.
See Brown v. Ruallam Enters., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) ("We
hold that the proper method of calculation is on the basis of net profit . . . gained by the
wrongdoer .. "),
overruled by Pro-Comp. Mgmt., Inc. v. R.K. Enters., LLC, 237 S.W.3d 20 (Ark.
2006). To the extent that Brown holds that a defendant's net profit is the exclusive measure of a
defendant's unjust enrichment, it has been overruled. See Pro-Comp Mgmt., Inc., 237 S.W.3d at
24-25 ("The conclusion in Brown that unjust enrichment must be defined solely through analysis
of profits is incorrect.").
With respect to calculation of a defendant's net profits from misappropriation, the plaintiff
has the burden of establishing the defendant's sales, and the defendant has the burden of
justifying deductions, including sales not attributable to misappropriation and expenses. See
Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 249 F. App'x 63, 78-79 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished
decision) (stating that a defendant has the burden of justifying deductions from sales).
A plaintiff has the option of recovering a defendant's unjust enrichment even though the
plaintiff would have licensed its trade secret rather than marketing a competing product. See
Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (10th Cir. 2008) (Utah enactment) ("In
Ballard's view, unjust enrichment damages are appropriate only when the defendant has used a
misappropriated trade secret to compete with the plaintiff, because there the defendant's profits
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misappropriation. 113 Courts can avoid overcompensating plaintiffs by
awarding either a plaintiffs actual loss or a defendant's unjust
enrichment, whichever is greater.1 1 4 However, awarding a plaintiffs
lost net profits for a defendant's sales in markets in which a plaintiff
competed and unjust-enrichment damages for a defendant's sales in
markets in which a plaintiff did not compete would not involve
overcompensation. 115
Unlike the Federal Circuit's construction of the Patent Code,
the Uniform Act does not deal with the evidence required to recover a
A state's general rules for tort
plaintiffs lost net profits.1 1 6
117
apply.
damages
compensatory

serve as a proxy for the plaintiffs lost profit.... [Tihe problem with Ballard's argument is that
the Utah legislature has rejected it." (internal citations omitted)). Allowing recovery of a
misappropriator's unjust enrichment reduces a competitor's incentive to spend on
misappropriation, which, in turn reduces a person with trade secret rights' need to make
expenditures protecting secrecy. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2007) (arguing that requiring disgorgement of unjust benefits
reduces a competitor's incentive to allocate more resources to misappropriation). But Professor
Lemley has observed that the focus must be upon enrichment that impairs a person with trade
secret rights' ability to cover necessary costs and to make a reasonable profit. Cf Mark A.
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2005)
(emphasizing that all benefits derived from another's intellectual property rights are not unjust).
113.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45, cmt. f (1995) ("The
standard of comparison measure determines the defendant's gain by comparing the defendant's
actual costs with the costs that the defendant would have incurred to achieve the same result
without the use of the appropriated trade secret."). One measure of the development costs saved
by the defendant is the plaintiffs development costs. See Syntron Bioresearch, Inc. v. Fan, 2002
WL 660446 at *12-14 (unpublished decision) (awarding an unjust enrichment recovery based
upon 75 percent of the plaintiffs costs of developing all its products), modified on denial of reh'g,
rev. denied (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). But the plaintiff should be awarded only the development costs
of misappropriated trade secrets of commercial value to the defendant. See id. at *12-13. An
injunction against future use adequately protects a plaintiff with respect to misappropriated
trade secrets that have not been of commercial value to a defendant. See id. at *14 ("[A]s to those
misappropriated trade secrets that were neither used nor commercially implemented, the
injunctive relief granted by the [trial] court... provided Syntron with complete relief.").
114.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45, cmt. c (1995) ("An award of
the greater of the two remedies thus ordinarily ...best prevents double recovery.").
115.
See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. 3512-VCS , 2010 WL 610725, at *28-31
(Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (awarding plaintiff lost-profit damages for
markets in which the plaintiff and the defendant corporation competed and unjust-enrichment
damages for markets in which the plaintiff did not compete).
116.
Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529-659
(2005), 76-100 (Supp. 2012), with Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1287-89 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
117.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45, cmt. a, (1995) ('The general
rules relating to the recovery of compensatory damages in tort actions apply in actions for the
misappropriation of trade secrets.").
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IV. THE PATENT CODE AND UNIFORM ACT STATUTORY ROYALTY
PROVISIONS

A. Inflation of Patent Code Statutory Royalty Recoveries
The Georgia-Pacificlist of reasonable-royalty factors includes
Factor fifteen, which reads:
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer)
would have agreed upon (at the time infringement began) if both had been reasonably
and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and
sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to
pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount
would
118
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.

But, the Federal Circuit takes a different view. In Rite-Height
Corp. v. Kelly Co.,119 the Federal Circuit commented: "The
hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a 'willing
licensor/willing licensee' negotiation. However, this is an inaccurate,
and even absurd, characterization .... [It is] a 'device in the aid of
120
justice."'
Furthermore, in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,121 a jury awarded an
amount in excess of an infringer's anticipated profit as a statutory
royalty. Upon appeal, the infringer requested a new trial with respect
to damages, contending that the Georgia-Pacificfactors required that
an infringer be allowed to make a reasonable profit. 122 The Federal
Circuit responded:
Ralph argues that no sane farmer would ever negotiate a royalty in excess of his
anticipated profits. However, although an infringer's anticipated profit from use of the
patented invention is "[a]mong the factors to be considered in determining" a reasonable
royalty, the law does not require that an infringer be permitted to make a profit. 123

Yet Georgia-PacificFactor fifteen indicates that a hypothetical
reasonable royalty should leave an infringer with a profit.1 24 In its
reasonable-royalty analysis, the Federal Circuit pays lip service to,
but does not follow, Georgia-Pacific Factor fifteen. Maxwell v. J.
118.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971).
119.
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
120.
Id. at 1554 n.13 (quoting Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075,
1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
121.
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
122.
See id. at 1383.
123.
Id. at 1384 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)).
124.
See Georgia-Pacific,318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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Baker, Inc. 125 clarifies the Federal Circuit's approach. In Maxwell, the
26
district court asked the jury to answer special interrogatories.1
Question eight asked what a reasonable royalty rate was; question ten
asked whether the patentee had been damaged in excess of the
amount of a reasonable royalty; and question eleven asked what
amount would compensate the patentee for any additional damage
suffered.127 The Federal Circuit held that the special interrogatories
were not an abuse of discretion. 128 According to the Federal Circuit,
the district court merely asked the jury to determine separately the
amount of an ordinary negotiated royalty and the additional amount
necessary to compensate the patentee for other damage caused by
infringement. 129 To deter infringement, a statutory royalty award
ordinarily combines these two components in a reasonable royalty "for
an infringer."130 Unless a reasonable royalty for an infringer was
higher than a negotiated royalty, the perception would be 'that
blatant, blind appropriation of inventions ... is the profitable,
can't-lose course."' 131 The court also found it to be relevant that "an
infringer had to be ordered by a court to pay damages, rather than
agreeing to a reasonable royalty." 132 Inflating the statutory royalty for
infringers could induce a patentee to refuse a request for a license and
later to sue the requestor for infringement in order to recover higher
statutory royalties than those to which the requestor would have
agreed. 133
Since 1946, the federal Patent Code has denied a utility
13 4
patentee the option of recovering an infringer's net profits.

125.
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1115
(1997).
126.
See id. at 1109.
127.
See id.
128.
See id.
129.
See id. at 1109-10
130.
Id. at 1110 (quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1562 (1983)).
131.
Id. at 1109 (quoting Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
132.
Id. at 1110.
133.
Cf. Lemley, supra note 7, at 667-68 ("[Tjhe situation has gotten so bad that some
patentees who can prove lost profits elect instead to seek a 'reasonable' royalty that is far in
excess both of what the parties would have negotiated and of the actual losses that the patentee
suffered.").
134.
The purpose of the 1946 amendment was to preclude the long and costly hearings
before masters and the insoluble problems of apportionment that had characterized infringement
actions in which an infringer's net profits had been sought to be recovered. See Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[T]he patent owner's
sole measure of recovery, other than a reasonable or established royalty, was to be his lost profits
.... "). An "established royalty" is derived from the royalties in a patentee's licenses of the patent
in suit. See Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Although a patentee can theoretically recover its own lost net
136
profits, 135 the leading federal case imposes a high burden of proof.
In order to compensate patentees adequately and to deter infringers,
37
the result has been judicial inflation of reasonable-royalty damages.
This has led some patentees who could prove lost net profits to seek
larger statutory royalty damages instead.138
B. No Reason to Inflate Damages under the Uniform Act
Unlike the Patent Code, the Uniform Act allows a person with
trade secret rights to recover both actual losses and a
misappropriator's unjust enrichment that the fact finder does not take
As case law has
into account in computing actual losses. 139
recognized, the Uniform Act's full range of monetary remedies
40
removes any need to inflate Uniform Act statutory royalty damages.1

135.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (2012). In the case of willful infringement and exceptional
circumstances, an enhanced section 284 recovery and discretionary attorney's fees also can be
recovered. See id.
136.
See Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152,
1156-57 (6th Cir. 1978); supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Lemley, supra note 7, at
658 (noting that courts quite often reject claims for lost profits).
137.
See Lemley, supra note 7, at 674 ("[T]he fear of undercompensating deserving patent
owners that should have been able to prove lost profits, has led to systematic distortions in the
reasonable royalty structure .... ").
138.
See id. at 667 (observing that some patentees that could prove lost profits seek larger
reasonable-royalty damages).
139.
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (no reference to an infringer's unjust enrichment),
with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 633-34 (2005) ("Damages can
include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss.").
See, e.g., Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 138 F.3d 449, 451-52 (2d
140.
Cir. 1998). Construing the California enactment, the court commented that "a punitive deterrent
award does not fall within the description of 'actual loss caused by misappropriation' for which
recovery may be had." Id.
The Uniform Act's approach has been regarded as more justifiable than the Patent Code's.
See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual
Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1693-94 (1998) ("[T]he general baseline recovery in
intellectual property cases should be the greater of the plaintiffs actual damages or the
defendant's profits attributable to infringement. . . . Of the four major bodies of intellectual
property law, trade secret law appears to adhere most closely. Patent law diverges from the
model by not permitting the plaintiff to recover restitutionary damages, and there appears to be
no compelling economic justification for this departure."). But Professor Lemley has observed
that the focus must be upon enrichment that impairs a person with trade secret rights' ability to
cover necessary costs and to make a reasonable profit. See Mark A. Lemley, Property,Intellectual
Property,and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2005) (emphasizing that all benefits
derived from another's intellectual property rights are not unjust).
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In Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland,14 1 for example, a
Delaware trial judge awarded a person with trade secret rights
$1,538,368 in lost net profits, a figure that reflected 20 percent of the
142
defendant-corporation's sales of competitive products for four years.
The trial judge also awarded $2,991,649 as unjust-enrichment
damages based upon three years of the other 80 percent of the
The judge calculated unjust
defendant-corporation's sales. 143
enrichment by subtracting the defendant-corporation's cost of goods
sold from its total revenue from the sale of the product developed with
the misappropriated information. Although the defendant claimed
that it was entitled to more deductions, it did not prove them.14 4 As
the Agilent Technologies case illustrates, under the Uniform Act there
is less need for any statutory royalty recovery and no need to inflate
statutory royalty damages when they are awarded.
C. Applying the Uniform Act Statutory Royalty Provision
As amended in 1985, section 3(a) of the Uniform Act provides
in part:
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by
misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for
a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret. 145

When the drafters were considering the 1985 official
amendment dealing with statutory royalty damages, University
Computing Co. v. Lykes- Youngstown Corp.146 was a leading common
law decision with respect to reasonable-royalty damages in trade
Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725, at *35 (Del. Ch.
141.
Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished decision).
Twenty percent was the trade secret rights holder's market share with respect to the
142.
competing products. See id. at *27-29. Agilent's use of market share analysis to establish a
plaintiffs lost net profits has been followed under the Florida enactment. See Premier Lab
Supply, Inc. v. Chemplex Indus., Inc., 94 So. 3d 640, 645-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). The
Federal Circuit considers that market share analysis can satisfy the Panduit test for a patentee's
lost net profits only if a patentee and an infringer sell substantially similar products in the same
market. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (Fed. Cir.
1993); supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the Panduit test).
See Agilent, 2010 WL 610725, at *30-31. The basic period for calculating a monetary
143.
recovery was the three-year "head start" that the defendant corporation had gained through
misappropriation. See id. at *26-27. The extra year of lost net profit damages was to compensate
the plaintiff for denial of its request for injunctive relief against competition. See id. at *27,
*31-32.
144.
See id. at *30.
145.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. at 633-34 (2005).
The 1979 version of the Uniform Act did not refer to reasonable royalties as a remedy. See id.
Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
146.
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Georgia's adoption of Restatement
secret cases. The case applied
1 47
(First) trade secret principles.
University Computing and Lykes had entered into a written
joint-venture contract to provide computer services to businesses in
the southeastern United States.' 48 One of the computer systems to be
marketed by the joint venture was AIMES III, an automated retail
49
inventory control system owned by University Computing.1
However, Lykes bribed an employee of a University Computing
licensee to disclose the system, after which Lykes unjustifiably
terminated the joint venture. 150 University Computing sued Lykes
based on several claims; one of which was trade secret
misappropriation of AIMES III. 151 A jury awarded University
1 52
Computing $220,000 for Lykes's trade secret misappropriation.
On appeal, the record did not show any specific loss to
University Computing nor any profit by Lykes from the
The parties agreed that a
misappropriated trade secrets. 153
reasonable-royalty award was appropriate but disagreed as to the
amount of a reasonable royalty. '54 The Fifth Circuit held that a
reasonable royalty must be based upon 'the actual value of what has
been appropriated"' and requires "a flexible and imaginative approach
to the problem of damages."' 55 Furthermore:
In calculating what a fair licensing price would have been had the parties agreed, the
trier of fact should consider such factors as the resulting and foreseeable changes in the
parties' competitive posture; that prices past purchasers and licensees may have paid;
the total value of the secret to the plaintiff, including the plaintiffs development costs
and the importance of the secret to the plaintiffs business; the nature and extent of the
use the defendant intended for the secret; and finally whatever other unique factors in
affected the parties' agreement, such as the ready
the particular case which might have
15 6
availability of alternative processes.

The Fifth Circuit emphasized that this reasonable-royalty test
was appropriate for cases like University Computing, in which: the
147.
See id. at 534 ("What Georgia law exists in this area seems to follow the
Restatement, Torts §757.").
See id. at 526-27.
148.
See id. at 528-29.
149.
150.
See id. at 532-34.
151.
See id. at 532-34.
152.
See id. at 526-29, 532-33, 543-46.
153.
See id.
154.
See id. at 536.
155.
See id. at 537-38 (quoting Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678, 683
(6th Cir. 1961)).
156.
Id. at 539 (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. G. W. Murphy Indus., Inc. 491 F.2d 923, 931
(5th Cir. 1973)). The Restatement of Unfair Competition's discussion of the factors pertinent to
the amount of a reasonable royalty both cites and paraphrases University Computing. Compare
id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. g (1995).
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parties were in direct competition; the defendant's course of conduct
extended over a period of time, including multiple uses of the
plaintiffs trade secret; and, the development of the trade secret had
been difficult. 15 7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury award of
$220,000 to University Computing based upon expert testimony
evaluating University Computing's prior offer to sell its trade secrets
to a third party for that amount. 158
University Computing was decided after Georgia-Pacific,which
articulated
the
commonly
applied
fifteen
nonexclusive
reasonable-royalty factors under the Patent Code. 159 Although the
court in University Computing considered patent cases appropriate
analogies,' 60 the University Computing opinion neither discussed nor
16
cited Georgia-Pacific.
1 Moreover, University Computing provides a
simpler statement of the nonexclusive factors relevant to the
hypothetical negotiation of a reasonable royalty. 62 Perhaps for that
reason, University Computing has been followed in a majority of the
163
reasonable-royalty cases under the Uniform Act.

157.
See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 538. On the other hand, if a defendant had made a
limited use of a plaintiffs trade secret that had ended, was not in direct competition with the
plaintiff, and the trade secret was relatively easy to discover, it could be sufficient to hold the
defendant liable for the costs it had saved through misappropriation. See id.
158.
See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 543-46.
159.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The Georgia-Pacific trial court decision
was handed down in 1970. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc.,
446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
160.
See Univ. Computing., 504 F.2d at 536 ("In the case before us, then, the 'appropriate
measure of damages, by analogy to patent infringement, is not what plaintiff lost, but rather the
benefits, profits, or advantages gained by the defendant in the use of the trade secret."' (quoting
Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1957))).
161.
See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 534-46.
162.
Compare supra note 156 and accompanying text (highlighting the reasonable-royalty
factors of University Computing), with supra note 90 and accompanying text (outlining the
fifteen Georgia-Pacificfactors).
163.
Many cases rely upon University Computing for their statutory royalty analysis. See,
e.g., Am. Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1476, 1479-80 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Va.
enactment); Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 179-180 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); Olson v. Nieman's, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 310-11 (Iowa 1998). Other cases rely upon
University Computing analysis either in dictum or for other purposes. See, e.g., Check 'N Go of
Va., Inc. v. Laserre, No. Civ.A.6:04 CV 00050, 2005 WL 1926609, at *4-6 (W.D. Va. 2005)
(dictum) (unpublished decision) (Va. enactment); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Ssangyong Cement Indus.
Co., No. C-89-3832 VRW, 1993 WL 317266, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dictum) (unpublished
decision) (Cal. enactment); Perdue Farms Corp. v. Hook, 777 So. 2d 1047, 1051-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (citing University Computing with respect to actual damages). The principal case
utilizing the Georgia-Pacificfactors to determine a Uniform Act statutory royalty is 02 Micro
Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2005), amended
on other grounds, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2006), affd per curiam, 221 F. App'x 996 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision).
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But, the University Computing framework is incomplete. Most
importantly, the University Computing factors omit the aspect of
Georgia-Pacific Factor fifteen that acknowledges that a hypothetical
licensee (an infringer) should be allowed to make a reasonable
I65
profit. 164 Additionally, Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc.,
which was decided under the California enactment, suggests two other
elements that should be part of a jury charge or a trial judge's findings
under the Uniform Act. The first is whether a misappropriated trade
secret accounted for only a portion of the profits earned by a
defendant.
If so, a reasonable royalty should be reduced
66
accordingly.
Second, the magistrate judge in Vermont Microsystems
had doubled the statutory royalty awarded to the plaintiff in order to
"deter" infringement. 16 7 The Second Circuit had reversed, stressing
that compensatory damages under the Uniform Act must redress
"actual loss" and that the willful and malicious misappropriation that
the Act requires for exemplary damages was not present in the
168
record.
Alternatively, Professor Mark Lemley and Daralyn Durie's
distillation of the fifteen nonexclusive Georgia-Pacificfactors into four
nonexclusive factors can be adapted to the Uniform Act. 6 9 Under an
adapted Lemley-Durie approach, the basic factors would be:
(1) whether a person with trade secret rights produces or will produce
a product in the market either directly or through licensing; (2) the
contribution made by the trade secret compared to the next best
alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary
to make the trade secret work; and (4) if the market has valued the
164.
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971); supra note 118 and accompanying text.
165.
Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc.,138 F.3d 449, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1998).
166.
See id. at 450 (dictum) ("If the trade secret accounts for only a portion of the profits
earned on the defendant's sales, such as when the trade secret relates to a single component of a
product marketable without the secret, an award to the plaintiff of defendant's entire profit may
be unjust." (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. f (1995))).

167.
See id. at 451.
168.
See id. at 451-52 (alternative holding). The Panel also observed that it would border
on the ridiculous to consider that a misappropriator would agree to pay more than the
misappropriated property's actual value in a hypothetical negotiation for a reasonable royalty.
See id. at 452. In a prior appeal of the Vermont Microsystems case, the Second Circuit also had
clarified the parameters of a hypothetical negotiation in which a trier of fact computes a
reasonable royalty. See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151-52 (2d
Cir. 1996). The court reversed a decision by a magistrate judge that had based the amount of a
reasonable royalty upon the amount that the person with trade secret rights would have charged
at the time that misappropriation occurred rather than upon what the parties would have agreed
in a hypothetical negotiation. See id. The court's primary reference for this standard was the
Georgia-PacificSecond Circuit opinion. See id.
169.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemley-Durie factors).
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trade secret, the extent to which that value differs from the outcome
under nonexclusive Factors (1), (2), and (3).170
The Lemley-Durie approach can be most readily applied if both
a person with trade secret rights and a misappropriator have used a
trade secret commercially. Yet the Uniform Act recognizes the
existence of trade secret rights that have not been used by the person
entitled to them. 171 It also authorizes a person with trade secret
rights to elect statutory royalty damages for either a misappropriator's
"unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret." 17 2 If neither a
person with trade secret rights nor a misappropriator has used a trade
secret, there may be no market value to consider under Lemley-Durie
Factor four.
Courts should apply Lemley-Durie Factor four, which includes
actual royalties charged for the trade secret at issue and comparable
trade secrets, to check the results of the prior three inquiries. 73 But,
negotiated royalties may have been discounted due to uncertainty as
to whether a trade secret was valid or had been misappropriated;
whereas, in a hypothetical negotiation, a trade secret is assumed to be
valid and to have been misappropriated, 174 which justifies a higher
royalty. 175
An adapted Lemley-Durie formulation of the nonexclusive
Georgia-Pacific factors should be melded with the Vermont
Microsystems requirement that Uniform Act reasonable royalties not
be "punitive."1 76 The Lemley-Durie formulation incorporates the other
Vermont Microsystems gloss requiring consideration of other
Finally, the FTC's
contributions to a defendant's profits. 177
17
8
evidentiary recommendations
could be integrated with either the

170.
Cf. Durie & Lemley, supra note 87, at 636.
171.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1, cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) ("[T]he
proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the
means to put a trade secret to use.").
See id. § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 634.
172.
173.
Durie & Lemley, supra note 87, at 642-43 (stating that actual royalties, which are
as a
discounted due to uncertainty as to patent validity and infringement, "are best viewed ..
check on the results of the prior three steps").
174.
See id. at 641-43.
175.
See id. at 642 ("[Actual royalties] must be enhanced to counteract the discount that
negotiating parties place on the likelihood that the patent is valid and infringed.").
176.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
177.
See Durie & Lemley, supra note 87, at 639-40. Lemley-Durie factor three takes into
consideration profits that should be attributed to nonpatented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by an infringer. See id.
See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
178.
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modified University Computing factors 179 or the adapted and modified
180
Lemley-Durie factors.
V. CONCLUSION

There are alternatives to the Federal Circuit's Georgia-Pacific
analysis that will produce more coherent statutory royalty
determinations under the Uniform Act. Rejection of the Federal
Circuit's current approach to statutory royalties should also ensure
that a person with trade secret rights will not exercise the option to
recover statutory royalty damages because of their artificial inflation.
Unlike the statutory royalties approved for utility patentees by
the Federal Circuit, the statutory royalty damages recoverable under
the Uniform Act should be compensatory, nonpunitive, and allow a
defendant a reasonable profit.
The University Computing
nonexclusive factors of reasonableness should be combined with
Georgia-PacificFactor fifteen, which allows an infringer a reasonable
profit. The Vermont Microsystem emphasis upon both the amount of a
misappropriator's profit attributable to misappropriation and the
rejection of punitive statutory royalties should also be added to the
analysis. Alternatively, adaptation of the Lemley-Durie distillation of
the Georgia-Pacific nonexclusive factors could be combined with
Vermont Microsystem's rejection of punitive statutory royalties.

179.
180.

See supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.

